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rule tends to encourage races to find the effectively unowned property. In any event, if original
owners retain property rights, finders may simply hide what they find, which reduces the value of
what is found without producing the aforementioned benefits to original owners.
3.5.3. Acquisition of stolen property and problems of establishing valid title. A basic
difficulty associated with sale of property that a legal system must solve is establishing validity of
ownership or  title. How does the buyer know whether the seller has good title, and how does
the buyer obtain good title? If these questions are not readily answered, sales transactions are
impeded, and theft may be encouraged.
One route that legal systems may take involves the use of registration systems: lists of items
and their owners. Important examples are registries of land, ships, motor vehicles, and many
financial instruments. Presuming that an item is recorded in a registry, it will be easy for a buyer
to check whether the seller holds good title to it, and the buyer will obtain title by having his name
recorded in the registry as the new owner. Also, a thief obviously cannot claim that something he
has stolen is his if someone else s name is listed as the owner in the registry. Registries are
usually publicly established, and listing in registries often is mandatory (or it may be encouraged
by making registration a condition to asserting a valid legal claim). Partial explanations for the
public role in registries are the coordination problem that may be involved in creating them and
the problem of insufficient private incentives to register property to provide a general deterrent
against theft. (An individual contemplating registration will not take into account that, as the
proportion of registered property rises, thieves anticipate that it will be more difficult to sell stolen
property and thus are discouraged from theft.)
For most goods, however, registries do not exist because of the expense of establishing and
maintaining them relative to the value of the goods and of the deterrence of theft. Two legal rules
for determination of title are available (and both, to some extent, are employed) in the absence of
registries. Under the original ownership rule, the buyer does not obtain good title if the seller did
not have it; the original owner can always claim title to the item if he can establish his prior
ownership. Under the bona fide purchaser rule, a buyer acquires good title as long as he had
reason to think that the sale was bona fide (that the seller had good title)  even if the item sold
46
For a survey of relevant literature, see Lueck (1998).
47
Other laws limit indirectly how much property can be taken by individuals by giving them title only if they make
productive use of the property that they find. This was true of homestead laws that gave land to individuals who worked it
and of water rights regimes that gave priority to the extent that water supplies were regularly used. Such rules, however,
- 20 -
create excessive incentives to exploit property.
was previously stolen or otherwise wrongfully obtained. These rules have different effects on
incentives for theft. Notably, under the bona fide purchaser rule, theft is made attractive because
thieves will often be able to sell their property to buyers (who will be motivated to  believe that
the sale is bona fide); the buyers can use the now validly-held property or resell it. Another social
cost of the bona fide purchaser rule is that original owners will spend more to protect their
property against theft because theft will be more frequent and, when it occurs, owners will be less
likely to recover their property. (These costs of protection, note, are analogous to those arising
under the rule allowing finders of lost property to keep it.) Finally, under the bona fide purchaser
rule, buyers will not have an incentive to expend effort determining whether there exists a third-
party original owner. This is an advantage in the direct sense that it reduces transaction costs, but
it also compromises deterrence of theft.
3.5.4. Involuntary transfer of property: adverse possession. The legal doctrine of
adverse possession effectively allows involuntary transfer of land (and some other types of
property): a person who is not the owner of land becomes its legal owner if he takes possession of
it and uses it openly and continuously for at least a prescribed period, such as ten years. Some
have suggested that a rationale for the rule is that it permits the transfer of land from those who
would leave it idle to those who will use it productively. But this overlooks the possibility that
there may be good reasons for allowing land to remain idle (perhaps it will be built upon later, and
thus an investment in it now would be a waste). Furthermore, a prospective adverse possessor
could always bargain with the owner to rent or buy the land. Additionally, the rule suffers from
the disadvantage that it induces landowners to expend resources policing incursions onto their
land and it encourages others to attempt adverse possession. (Observe that these latter arguments
are similar to those in the preceding sections that favored rules protecting original owners.)
A historical justification for the rule is that, before reliable land registries existed, it allowed a
landowner to establish good title to a buyer relatively easily: the seller need only show that he was
on the land for the prescribed period. Another advantage of the rule is that it reduces disputes
that would arise where structures turn out to encroach on neighboring parcels.48
3.5.5. Constraints on sale of property. Legal restrictions are often imposed on the sale of
goods and services, including taxation and the outright banning of sale. One standard justification
for such policies is externalities. For example, the sale of handguns may be made illegal because
of the externality their ownership creates, namely, crime, and a tax may be imposed on the sale of
a fuel because its use pollutes the air. See section 3.6. The other standard justification for legal
restrictions on sale is lack of consumer information. For instance, a drug may not be sold without
a prescription because of fear that buyers would not use it appropriately. Here, though, one must [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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