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from 2006, the Board would ensure that its us history test would be conducted every four years. This would be the basis for intended legis- lation to authorize a pilot study that would provide state-by-state comparison of us history and civics test data, the approach taken in the proposed American History Achievement Act. This emphasis on the need for history detracts attention from the problems posed by the subject. Public history is apt to be history as answers, not history as questions. There is a marked contrast between the questioning ethos and methods that are central to the modern notion of scholarship, and, on the other hand, a public use of history in which the emphasis is rather on answers, with public myths providing ways to make sense of the past. It is indicative that the historian who testified to the Senate Subcommittee in June 2005 was the popular writer David McCullough, who claimed that history texts were often written in a style that was far too boring to interest students and that, instead, it was necessary to emphasize the literature of history and for teachers to focus on narrative history to reach students. Engaging students is clearly a central issue, but an understanding of the process of history is offered only by narratives that are alive to contrasting interpretations and to the problems of using evidence. If the Senate chooses to ignore this, as it probably will, then there is likely to be a false coherence in the narratives it sanctions. As an example of the absence of monoliths in American public life, there is no institutional body to provide discipline in the cause of coherence, as the Communist Party seeks to do in China. Indeed, although the Democrats and the Republicans are each less diverse and c onc l us i ons 235 therefore with fewer coalitions than in the past, they still lack the disci- plinary centralization of political parties across much of the Free World. This approach can be taken further by referring to business, capital and labour, each of which resists direction and unification. The labour movement proved particularly divided in the 2000s. Within the political parties, the lure of conformity to dominant themes, partic- ularly the ideas held by activists, is matched by a search for moderate support. This can be seen not only from politicians widely regarded as moderate, but also from those who are seen by opponents as extreme. Thus, despite the general presentation of him, George W. Bush in 2005 avoided nominating known doctrinaire conservatives for the first Supreme Court vacancy, and initially for the second vacancy, and he also made major efforts to woo black support, while, as she positioned herself for a Presidential run, Hillary Clinton changed her position on abortion and on power projection abroad. These political shifts and expedients reflected the extent to which the electorate was less doctrinaire than the divisiveness of culture wars might suggest. Polls indicate a strong support for tolerance, especially among the young, but also a widely diffused patriotism and religious faith that contrasts with the situation in Europe. The combination of pre-marital sexual licence with the popularity of marriage and parent- hood indicate that the values of both the 60s and the 50s remain important. To some critics, diversity has become excessive and a threat to social cohesion and political interest. These arguments are applied in partic- ular against liberal individualism and large-scale Hispanic immigration. Each, indeed, challenges any attempt at direction. Liberal individualism leads many conservatives to a sense of cultural and social crisis. In practice, few of the fears expressed in the 1960s have materialized. Drug use remains a serious problem, but although it has helped to cause serious social difficulties in inner cities, with savage conse- quences for many, it has not led to the general breakdown that was feared. In suburban areas, drug use is a cause of individual and family problems, rather than general societal crisis, and the same is true of violence. Ironically, suburban anxieties are more easily expressed by transposing them onto the inner cities. The marked rise in pre-marital 236 a l t e r e d s t a t e s sex in the 1960s did not lead to the end of marriage but to its post- ponement, with many young people having relatively stable relationships in the meanwhile, and not the promiscuity depicted by critics. The major increase in divorces in the late 1960s and early 70s has not led to the breakdown of the family, as was feared, but, instead, to an unprecedented rate of remarriage. Furthermore, many of these problem indices improved in the early 2000s, with abortion, crime, divorce and teenage pregnancy rates all falling. This does not mean the end of culture wars, but rather that the charge that liberalism and 1960s values led to social breakdown can be rejected. Instead, American society has reshaped, with a differing mix of conformism and individualism to that in the 1950s. Generational issues played a major role in the reshaping, as issues were reformulated or new ones framed. The power of the Baby Boomers reached out in many direc- tions, creating new expectations. For example, new approaches to generational issues, such as the menopause, hair loss and weight gain, influenced medical practice and drug companies. This reshaping interacted with that of changes in the world of work. The make-up of the work force changed dramatically after 1950. Today the percentages are 3 in agriculture, 16 in manufacturing and the balance service-oriented. This change from a manufacturing to a serv- ice society is as great as it was in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the usa was transformed from a predominantly ruralist agrarian society to an increasingly urban manufacturing one, albeit [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |