[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
chapter. 4 Of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being (Chapter III, paras 1 19) 1 Although he singles out Von Humboldt, Mill might also have mentioned various other German philosophers who were just as committed to a many- sided character-ideal, in which some sort of harmonious fusion of different human capacities and powers is attained. Goethe says, for example: Man . . . can only accomplish the unique, the wholly unexpected, if all his qualities unite within him and work together as one. This was the happy lot of the ancients, especially the Greeks in their golden age (1994, pp. 100 1). 2 The idea of a clerisy can be construed to mean something like a system of universities, perhaps subsidized by the taxpayer, whose faculties control appointments and enjoy job tenure during good behaviour. 5 Of the limits to the authority of society over the individual (Chapter IV, paras 1 21) 1 Mill certainly does not advocate indifference to self-regarding vices, as Hart emphasizes (1963, pp. 76-7). But natural penalties are not the same thing as deliberate moral blame or punishment. Social stigma, the intentional display in public of disapproval, does not legitimately extend to self-regarding conduct because such conduct is harmless to others. 2 For Hume s distinction between natural and artificial virtues and vices, see Hume (1978), pp. 294-8, 474-5, 477-621; and Hume (1975), pp. 169-284, 303-11. 3 Recall his related claim that thoughts and opinions are not properly termed immoral (II.11, p. 234). 4 This situation, where the individual has an incentive to defect from an agreement under which everyone (including himself) would be better off, is a classic example of what is sometimes called the Prisoners Dilemma in the theory of games. 217 NOTES 6 Applications (Chapter V, paras 1-23) 1 For his view of the generally expedient functions of government, see Mill (1871), pp. 797-971. 2 Recall that if a commodity only has uses which involve harm to other people, society can legitimately prohibit its production altogether. 3 In whatever way we define or understand the idea of a right , Mill insists in his Representative Government, no person can have a right (except in the purely legal sense) to power over others: every such power, which he is allowed to possess, is morally, in the fullest force of the term, a trust (1861a, p. 488). The power of the franchise, for example, is a moral trust, as is the power of attorney or the authority granted to parents over children. See also Mill s distinction between two intrinsically very different dispositions, namely, the desire to exercise power over others and the disinclination to have power exercised over [oneself] (ibid., p. 420). 4 Mill (1869b) elaborates on this argument. 5 For further discussion of the design of an optimal democratic constitution, see Mill s Representative Government (1861a). 6 A possible reason is that the distribution of benefits is unequal, and that the third party dislikes his share of the benefits as too small relative to the shares of others. Even though he suffers no absolute setback, his unequal share might be defined as perceptible damage to him. If so, the action (though it confers advantages on him) would be harmful to him, and thus subject to social control. Even if the idea of harm is stretched in this fashion, however, the argument in favour of laissez-faire, pursued later in this section of the text, is not affected. 7 This is one place (among many others) where Mill evidently rejects traditional act-utilitarian reasoning. See also his letter of 10 January 1862 to Grote, in Mill (1862). 8 For further discussion pertinent to this point, see Taylor (1982, 1987). 7 Liberal utilitarianism 1 Ten is apparently attracted to the non-standard versions of utilitarianism ascribed to Mill by revisionist scholars, but he prefers to treat such interpretations as non-utilitarian (1991, pp. 236 7). His caution is certainly understandable. 2 True, certain social conventions (e.g., of promising) may exist, which enable self-interested citizens to predict and rely on one another s behaviour. 218 NOTES Act utilitarianism may well take account of such conventions, when making its prescriptions of which acts to perform. But it cannot itself recommend such conventions, let alone tell us which may be optimal. 3 For a helpful discussion of various issues surrounding justified coercion against failures to prevent harm to others, see Feinberg (1984 8), Vol. 1, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |