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republics of the USSR, Ukraine for instance, atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 170 THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY S parts. The first part will discuss the content Moscow s part between 1950 and 1953 that APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET of the Foreign Ministry s report, highlight- had impeded the successful development RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ing items of particular interest as well as of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959 several important lacunae. The second part full equality, mutuality, and trust. 6 will consider how Zimyanin s assessment His views on this matter, interestingly by Mark Kramer contributed to, and was affected by, changes enough, were very similar to conclusions under way in Soviet policy-making toward reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the In early September 1959, Soviet For- China. Those changes, as explained below, early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and eign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Beijing to project an image of monolithic the head of the Foreign Ministry s Far East- Ministry and therefore gave increased promi- unity (an image, incidentally, that was not ern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to pre- nence to Zimyanin s report. far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time pare a detailed background report on China could sense that negotiations leading to the for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will September and early October to take part in In both substance and tone, Zimyanin s between the two countries. According to a ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary analysis of Soviet relations with China re- secret background report, Mao was highly of the Communist victory in China. The flected the burgeoning unease among Soviet dissatisfied with [Moscow s] attempted ex- Soviet leader s trip, as Gromyko was well officials. Although his view of the relation- actions on China, and Zhou Enlai said he aware, was also intended to alleviate a grow- ship was still distinctly favorable overall, he would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] ing rift between Moscow and Beijing a was quick to point out many areas of incipi- demands as presented. 7 Although Soviet rift that had not yet flared up in public. ent conflict between the two countries. His and Chinese officials did their best to con- Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to report suggested that a full-fledged rift could ceal any further hints of bilateral discord travel to China because he had numerous be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent over the next few years, word continued to other commitments at around the same time; differences were bound to cause growing filter into Washington about strain and dif- but after discussing the matter with his col- acrimony and recriminations unless appro- ficulties between Communist China and Rus- leagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided priate steps were taken. In citing a litany of sia the same strain and difficulties that that face-to-face negotiations with Mao disagreements about key ideological and Zimyanin noted.8 Zedong and other top Chinese officials practical questions, the report drew a causal By tracing the origins of the Sino-So- would be the only way to clear the atmo- link between internal political conditions in viet conflict back to the Stalin period, sphere and restore a sense of friendship China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, Zimyanin s report was quite different from between our peoples. 1 a theme emphasized by many Western ana- the public statements made later on by offi- Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30- lysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin con- cials in both Moscow and Beijing, who page survey of The Political, Economic, cluded the document on an upbeat note averred that the split had begun when the and International Standing of the PRC (Re- claiming that relations of fraternal amity two sides disagreed about Khrushchev s se- port No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the and fruitful cooperation have been estab- cret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress same day that Khrushchev began a highly lished on a lasting basis and are growing in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large publicized visit to the United States. The wider and stronger with every passing year majority of Western (and Russian) scholars Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 his analysis left little doubt that existing had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in September, just a day before he was due to tensions between Moscow and Beijing could which to pinpoint the origins of the dis- leave for China. On his way back from the eventually take a sharp turn for the worse. pute.10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin s United States, he was given a copy of Four specific points about the document report and from other new evidence (see Zimyanin s report. That copy is now housed are worth highlighting. below), that tensions actually had begun in the former CPSU Central Committee First, the report acknowledged that fric- emerging much earlier. archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as tion between the two Communist states had This is not to say that the whole Sino- the Center for Storage of Contemporary been present, to some degree, since the very Soviet rift, especially the bitter confronta- Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin tion of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. section of Zimyanin s report, which focuses did not imply that China had been merely a Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the reluctant and suspicious ally of Moscow in but the reality is usually more complex. Far most interesting portion of the document, is the early 1950s, he emphasized that the So- from being a reluctant and suspicious ally translated here in full except for a few extra- viet Union under Stalin had violated the of the Soviet Union during the first half of neous passages at the beginning and end.3 sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet Zimyanin s appraisal of Sino-Soviet People s Republic and had kept the PRC in experience and to forge close, comprehen- relations is intriguing not only because of its a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR. 5 sive ties with Moscow in the name of social- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ] |